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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST ONE BANK, UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
VIRGINIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930476-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellant/ Life Insurance Company of Virginia 
("LOV"), petitions for rehearing on the Opinion issued by the 
Court on December 21, 1994. This petition is brought under 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel for 
the petitioner certifies that the petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
The Court has incorrectly decided the issues. The 
Court's error is in characterizing the appellant's conduct as a 
setoff. All of its analysis and the erroneous conclusion derive 
from that seminal error. 
The Court's error is apparent from inconsistencies in 
the Opinion itself. In its recitation of facts on page 2, the 
Court acknowledges that the arrangement for LOV to apply UUI's 
commissions was consensual and intentional, and it was made as 
consideration for LOV's advance of funds to UUI.1 This 
undisputed fact is again noted in footnote 5 on page 8 of the 
Opinion. LOV applied the commissions as a result of "a second 
assignment in favor of Life of Virginia." Id* These facts are 
*What the Court characterizes in its Opinion as "a second 
assignment in favor of Life of Virginia" is an explicit instruction 
by UUI to apply ongoing commissions for the repayment of LOV's 
advance: "Assignor hereby authorizes and directs the Life 
Insurance Company of Virginia to credit said commission [sic] 
against the balance of the Assignor's obligation to the Life 
Insurance Company of Virginia by virtue of the Note dated March 1, 
1989 made by the Assignor and held by the Life Insurance Company of 
Virginia." Record at 00093. This authorization is dated March 2, 
1989. It is an integral part of the agreement between for LOV's 
advance to UUI. It is not an alternative source of repayment 
arranged after the advance or as a consequence of any failure by 
UUI to make payments from some other, originally contemplated 
source. (R. at 00093) 
2 
incompatible with the conclusion that LOV exercised a unilateral 
setoff. 
The Court is obviously aware of the law of setoff which 
it announced in Mark VII Financial Consultants Corp. v. Smedley, 
792 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah App. 1990) and cited on page 4 of the 
Opinion. A setoff is a counterclaim which arises from a separate 
or unrelated transaction. Id. at 132. Smedley does suggest that 
the distinction between setoff and recoupment is not significant 
for purposes of civil procedure (i.e., for determining mandatory 
and permissive counterclaims under Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure). But Smedley does not abandon setoff as a discrete 
principle of law. Unfortunately, the present Opinion does, and 
it does so sub silentio. 
The Opinion seems to rely on a perception that LOV is 
trying to subordinate or trump West One's interest, and because 
LOV has shown no defect in that properly perfected interest, LOV 
must necessarily fail. (See Opinion at page 2-3) This 
characterization of LOV's position is incorrect, and it has 
skewed the Court's analysis. LOV does not contest that West 
One's interest in the insurance policy commissions was perfected 
prior to the assignment from UUI to LOV. However, West One's 
rights are not unlimited. No one, including West One, has ever 
even suggested that. 
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It is a given that West One's rights are limited by the 
terms of its own security documents. U.C.A. Section 78-9-201; 
and Insley Manufacturing Corp* v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 
1341, 1345 (Utah 1986). And yet, West One has never satisfied 
the basic requirements of its own contract.2 
It is also fundamental that UUI had the right to "use, 
commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral" until West 
One acted on its perfected security interest by directing the 
account debtor (LOV) to pay the commissions directly to West One. 
U.C.A. Section 78-9-205. The Court acknowledged this right when 
the issue was addressed in oral argument. Yet, nowhere does the 
Court's Opinion explain why that right somehow disappears when 
2West One's security agreement is contained in the document 
entitled Assignment of Contract as Collateral. Paragraph 7a. of 
that document says: "Upon or at any time after default [by UUI] . 
. . [West One may] make demand and sue for all rents, income, 
commission and profits under the Contracts. . . . " Record at 
00088. Under this term, West One must wait for a default by UUI 
and then make demand for LOV to pay over commissions before LOV is 
obligated to do anything other than follow UUI's direction. 
Section 7a. of the security agreement continues: "Assignor 
(UUI) is further authorized to direct the Companies (i.e., LOV) 
under any Contracts hereafter entered into by Assignor, on receipt 
of written notice from Assignee (i.e., West One), to pay to 
Assignee all rents, income, issue and profits accruing under the 
Contracts. . . . " Here again, West One's interest is limited by 
its own document which requires direction to the contract debtor 
(LOV) to make payment directly to West One before any obligation to 
do so arises. 
Except to the extent its June 19,1992 Complaint can be couched 
as the requisite notice to pay over commissions, West One has still 
not exercised its contractual and statutory rights correctly. 
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the source of the commissions happens to coincide with a 
destination for them which is intentionally and volitionally 
designated by UUI. 
Finally, it is undisputed that LOV, as the account 
debtor on the commissions, had the right to follow UUI's 
direction as to the payment of the commissions until it received 
notification from West One that "the amount due or to become due 
has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the 
assignee." U.C.A. Section 78-9-318(3). Neither West One nor UUI 
ever gave notice to LOV to pay commissions to West One.3 LOV's 
right, even its obligation, to follow UUI's direction for the 
"use, commingling, or disposal" of the commissions is thus 
statutorily protected. 
This is the statutory scheme of intermingled rights 
under the Uniform Commercial Code. It is also the express term 
of the security agreement between UUI and West One, and the 
express term in the notification given by West One to LOV. The 
Court's Opinion reads the fundamental protections of Sections 9-
205 and 9-318(3) right out of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 
3West One's Notice of Assignment to LOV specifically recites 
that "upon written notice from Continental Bank & Trust Company 
[i.e., West One's predecessor in interest], all monies due or to 
become due under the Contract described above are to be paid to The 
Continental Bank & Trust Company pursuant to this Assignment." 
Record at 00042. This is explicitly not a current direction to pay 
commissions directly to West One's predecessor. 
5 
context of assigned accounts. It also inexplicably enhances West 
One's rights over those which are allowed by statute and reserved 
in West One's own documents. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relies on several 
cases which involve true setoffs of non-mutual debts in non-
consensual circumstances. For instance, Insley Manufacturing 
Corp. involves a bank which covered overdraft checks without 
contemplation or consideration of the source of repayment. 
Later, when unrelated funds which were restricted proceeds of 
collateral came through its account, it unilaterally applied 
those funds to the overdrafts. In essence, the bank executed on 
someone elses collateral. 
The contrast between those circumstances and the 
present case is fundamental. Here, LOV only made the advance to 
UUI in contemplation of and with the direction by UUI that the 
source of repayment would be the commissions. Certainly, LOV was 
on notice that the commissions were subject to the perfected 
security interest of West One. And if West One had acted on its 
security interest, LOV would have been required to bow to West 
One's priority. However, UUI had the right to make the 
assignment to LOV and LOV had the right to follow or accept the 
assignment until West One declared a default and demanded payment 
over to itself. West One never made the requisite demand. 
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The Court also relied on In re Apex Oil Co.P 975 F.2d 
1365 (8th Cir. 1992). But the Court's own recitation of the Apex 
facts shows that in that case the assignor's (ARTOC) invoices 
were stamped not only with notice of the secured creditor's 
interest but also with a present direction that payments be made 
to the secured creditor's lock box. This is a critical 
distinction from the facts of the present case. The same pivotal 
distinction is also found in Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. 
United Airlines. Inc.. 122 B.R. 871, 875 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Obviously, LOV would like the Court's Opinion corrected 
because the result is unfavorable to it. But in addition, the 
Opinion should be changed because it undermines the carefully 
balanced rights of creditors and debtors under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Furthermore, it implicitly and unnecessarily 
broadens the concept of setoff, with unknown mischief to be 
reaped in the future. Finally, because of the internal 
inconsistencies in the Opinion, it is simply bad jurisprudence. 
The Opinion strains to reach a result which is not necessary and 
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not justified by the statutes, by West One's documents, or by any 
overriding equities. 
JL 
DATED this 6~TdaY o f January, 1995, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
PTT^KT.T, Q^ttXptCVZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, on this ffil day of /hlAUutyf , 1995, to the 
following: / 
Carolyn Montgomery 
James H. Woodall 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
2 01 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
38999 
8 
